Despite several works on secrecy coding for fading and MIMO wiretap channels from an error probability perspective, the construction of information-theoretically secure codes over such channels remains an open problem. In this paper, we consider a fading wiretap channel model where the transmitter has only partial statistical channel state information. Our channel model includes static channels, i.i.d. block fading channels, and ergodic stationary fading with fast decay of large deviations for the eavesdropper's channel. We extend the flatness factor criterion from the Gaussian wiretap channel to fading and MIMO wiretap channels, and establish a simple design criterion where the normalized product distance/minimum determinant of the lattice and its dual should be maximized simultaneously. Moreover, we propose concrete lattice codes satisfying this design criterion, which are built from algebraic number fields with constant root discriminant in the single-antenna case, and from division algebras centered at such number fields in the multipleantenna case. The proposed lattice codes achieve strong secrecy and semantic security for all rates R < C b − C e − κ, where C b and C e are Bob and Eve's channel capacities, respectively, and κ is an explicit constant gap. Furthermore, these codes are almost universal in the sense that a fixed code is good for secrecy for a wide range of fading models. Finally, we consider a compound wiretap model with a more restricted uncertainty set, and show that rates R <C b −C e − κ are achievable, whereC b is a lower bound for Bob's capacity andC e is an upper bound for Eve's capacity for all the channels in the set.
the use of secret keys. Wyner's secrecy condition, which is sometimes called the weak secrecy condition, requires that the normalized mutual information 1 k I(M; Z k ) between the confidential message M and the channel output Z k should vanish when the code length k tends to infinity. However, certain weak secrecy schemes exhibit security flaws [3] , and today the most widely accepted secrecy metric in the information theory community is Csiszár's strong secrecy [4] , i.e. I(M; Z k ) should tend to zero when k tends to infinity.
While in the information theory community confidential messages are often assumed to be uniformly distributed, this assumption is not accepted in cryptography. A cryptographic treatment of the wiretap channel was proposed in [5] to combine the requirements of the two communities, establishing that achieving semantic security in the cryptographic sense is equivalent to achieving strong secrecy for all distributions of the message. This equivalence holds to some extent also for continuous channels [6, Proposition 1] .
A. Known Results on the Secrecy Capacity of Wiretap Channels
The original work of Wyner considered discrete channels; the Gaussian wiretap channel was first studied in [7] where it was proven that its (weak) secrecy capacity is C b −C e , where C b and C e are the capacities of Bob and Eve's channels respectively. Ergodic fading models were first considered in [8] and [9] and their secrecy capacity was investigated under the assumption of perfect channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT); [9] also considered the scenario where the CSI of the legitimate channel is perfectly known, but there is only statistical information about the wiretapper's channel, and gave some degrees of freedom results in this case. All these early works were under the assumption of weak secrecy.
Clearly, the assumption of perfect CSIT about Eve's channel is unrealistic in most cases, and for fast fading channels, even the assumption of perfect CSIT about Bob's channel may be problematic. A general (non-explicit) formula for the secrecy capacity of a fading wiretap channel with imperfect CSIT was given in [10] for an intermediate secrecy metric based on variational distance. With statistical CSIT only, the weak secrecy capacity is C b − C e for i.i.d. Rayleigh fading wiretap channels such that Bob and Eve's channels are independent [11] .
Note that while it is often argued that it is possible to obtain strong secrecy from weak secrecy "for free" using the privacy amplification technique in [12] , applying this technique to fading channels without CSIT seems to be an open problem; see the discussion in [13] .
The weak secrecy capacity of multiple-input multiple output (MIMO) Gaussian wiretap channels was investigated in [14] - [17] assuming perfect CSIT. In this setting, it was also shown in [18] that the MIMO channel can be decomposed into parallel channels, allowing to use scalar Gaussian codebooks to achieve strong secrecy.
The case of fading channels where only statistical CSIT is available is less well-understood. In [19] it was shown that the weak secrecy capacity for i.i.d. Rayleigh fading MIMO wiretap channels is C b − C e if Bob and Eve's channels are independent.
Yet these channel models are rather restrictive, since knowing the channel statistics of the wiretapper is a strong assumption. A more general model is the compound channel, 1 where Bob and Eve's channels belong to a certain uncertainty set (D b , D e ). Following the standard convention in [20] we say that a sequence of wiretap codes achieve rate R if it achieves the strong secrecy rate R for each of the pairs (D b , D e ) ∈ (D b , D e ) in the uncertainty set uniformly, i.e. Eve's leakage and Bob's error probability tend to zero uniformly. The compound capacity can then be defined as the maximal achievable rate. The ultimate goal of code design would then be to find a code that uniformly achieves rate C b − C e for all the channel pairs such that Bob's capacity is lower bounded by C b and Eve's capacity is upper bounded by C e . Unfortunately it is not known whether this goal is achievable. The secrecy capacity of degraded compound wiretap channels was studied in [21] - [23] . An arbitrarily varying MIMO channel with no CSI about the wiretapper was considered in [13] , assuming perfect CSI of the legitimate channel and that the wiretapper has less antennas than the legitimate receiver. For arbitrarily varying wiretap channels, the deterministic compound capacity was shown to be discontinuous with respect to small variations in the uncertainty set [24] .
If we relax the constraint of uniform convergence in the definition of compound capacity as in Han's definition [25] (see also the discussion in [26] ), then we can deal with more general uncertainty sets. With Han's definition, a wiretap code achieves rate R over the compound channel if it achieves this rate for any channel pair (D b , D e ) ∈ (D b , D e ) individually. Obviously the compound capacity in Han's sense cannot be smaller than the standard compound capacity, but again it is not known for general uncertainty sets.
B. Previous Code Constructions 1) Coding for Wiretap Channels:
In the case of discrete memoryless channels, the first wiretap code constructions were based on polar codes [27] and LDPC codes [28] for degraded and symmetric wiretap channels. The polar code construction was extended to general wiretap channels in [29] and [30] .
Lattice codes for the Gaussian wiretap channel under an error probability criterion were first proposed in [31] and [32] . Subsequent works on algebraic lattice codes extended the error probability approach to fading and MIMO channels [33] - [36] .
In the case of Gaussian wiretap channels, [6] considered the problem of designing lattice codes which achieve strong secrecy and semantic security. Following an approach by Csiszár [4] , [37] , strong secrecy is guaranteed if the output distributions of the eavesdropper's channel corresponding to different messages are indistinguishable in the sense of variational distance. To this aim, the flatness factor of a lattice was proposed in [6] as a fundamental criterion which implies that conditional outputs are indistinguishable. Using random coding arguments, it was shown that there exist families of lattice codes which are good for secrecy, meaning that their flatness factor is vanishing, and achieve strong secrecy and semantic security for rates up to 1/2 nat from the secrecy capacity. The work [38] adopted the flatness factor as a design criterion in MIMO wiretap channels, yet it is unclear whether that approach achieves strong secrecy.
Other non-algebraic lattice code constructions with strong secrecy include polar lattices for Gaussian wiretap channels [39] . A different approach (not based on lattices) in [40] achieves the strong secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel using 2-universal hash functions.
2) Universal Codes for Fading Channels: Several previous works considered the problem of designing universal codes for fading and MIMO channels without secrecy constraints. Division algebras were first used to obtain MIMO codes that are "approximately universal" from the point of view of the diversity-multiplexing gain trade-off in [41] . Lattice codes with precoded-integer forcing were shown to achieve constant gap to MIMO capacity in slow fading channels in [42] . Most closely related to the present work, [43] proposed a construction of algebraic lattices based on number field towers which are almost universal over static and ergodic fading MIMO channels. More recently, random lattice codes from Generalized Construction A were shown to achieve compound capacity for the uncertainty set of static MIMO channels [44] . After this paper was first submitted, the Generalized Construction A was extended to a MIMO wiretap setting [45] .
C. Main Contributions 1) Main Results:
We consider a MIMO fading wiretap channel model where the transmitter has only access to partial statistical CSI, while the legitimate receiver has perfect knowledge of its own channel, and the eavesdropper has perfect knowledge of both channels. All static, i.i.d. fading and i.i.d. block fading, and all ergodic fading models are allowed for the main channel. For the eavesdropper's channel, our results hold for static channels, i.i.d. fading and block fading channels, and stationary ergodic channels with faster than linear convergence in the law of large numbers.
We propose an algebraic construction of lattices which achieve strong secrecy and semantic security for all secrecy rates R < C b − C e − κ, where C b and C e are Bob and Eve's channel capacities respectively, and κ is an explicit constant gap which depends on the geometric invariants of the chosen lattices. 2 Our codes are almost universal in the sense that given C b and C e , the same code is good for secrecy for a wide range of fading models. Since for many of the channel models we consider we don't know the actual strong secrecy capacity, the achievable rate C b − C e − κ provides a lower bound.
Thanks to the universality property, our codes do achieve a constant gap to the compound capacity in Han's sense. The gap is at most κ because for some wiretap channels in the compound set, the achievable rate is at most C b − C e . For individual fading channel pairs where the capacity is known to be C b − C e , our gap to capacity is exactly κ.
We also consider a compound channel model with the standard definition of compound capacity, and prove that if we consider a more restrictive uncertainty set, then we can guarantee uniform bounds for the error probability and the leaked information, and our codes achieve a constant gap κ to the standard compound capacity.
Unfortunately, for the best currently known families of lattices from algebraic number fields the value of κ turns out to be very large: 9.75 bits per complex channel use, which for an i.i.d. Rayleigh fading channel corresponds to an SNR advantage of approximately 30 dB for the legitimate receiver. Some perspectives to improve this gap are discussed in the conclusion of the paper.
2) Design Criteria: We extend the secrecy criterion based on the flatness factor in [6] to the case of fading and MIMO channels and propose a family of concrete lattice codes from algebraic number fields satisfying this criterion. Intuitively, a vanishing flatness factor, to be defined precisely in our paper, implies that the output distributions of the eavesdropper's channel corresponding to different messages converge to the same distribution (which depends on the eavesdropper's channel). Hence no information is leaked to the eavesdropper asymptotically, even if she knows her channel as well as the legitimate user's channel.
The key feature to guarantee secrecy is that the dual of the faded lattice at the eavesdropper should have a good minimum distance, so that the flatness factor of the faded lattice vanishes with high probability. At the same time, to guarantee reliability, the faded lattice at the legitimate receiver should have a good minimum distance when the channel is not in outage.
More precisely, we establish a simple design criterion where the normalized product distance / normalized minimum determinant of the lattice and its dual should be maximized simultaneously; in the case of the Gaussian wiretap channel, the packing density of the lattice and its dual should be maximized. 3 The gap κ to the secrecy capacity only depends on these geometric invariants.
3) Lattice Construction: Our wiretap lattice codes are constructed from a particular sequence of algebraic number fields with constant root discriminant. 4 These lattices were already used in [43] and [47] to design almost universal codes for fading and MIMO channels without secrecy constraints.
In this paper, we show that the underlying multiplicative structure and constant root discriminant property guarantee that the lattices and their duals satisfy our joint design criteria for secrecy. Compared to [43] , we also improve the coding rate by replacing spherical shaping with a discrete Gaussian distribution over the infinite lattice as in [6] .
D. Organization of the Paper
To make the paper reader-friendly, we present our methodology firstly for single-antenna fading wiretap channels, then for MIMO wiretap channels, since the latter requires division algebras which are more technical. The rest of the paper is accordingly organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce some technical tools, such as the lattice Gaussian distribution, the flatness factor, and ideal lattices. Section III is devoted to code construction and security proofs for single-antenna fading wiretap channels. The proposed lattice codes can be generalized to the MIMO case using the multi-block matrix lattices from division algebras in [43] . This is accomplished in Section IV and V, which may be skipped in the first reading. In Section VI, we extend our achievability results to the compound model. In Section VII, we discuss the implications of our results in terms of code design criteria. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper and presents some open problems.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Basic Lattice Definitions
In this section we recall some basic notions about lattices and define the corresponding notations.
Consider C k as a 2k-dimensional real vector space with the real inner product
This inner product naturally defines a metric on the space C k by setting x = √ x, x. With this inner product, we can identify C k with R 2k with the canonical real inner product, through the isometry
An n-dimensional lattice is a discrete subgroup of R n defined by
where the columns of the generator matrix M G ∈ M n (R) are linearly independent.
We consider lattices of even dimension n = 2k in the Euclidean space R 2k , which is identified with the complex space C k through (2) . Given a lattice ⊂ C k , we define the dual lattice as * = {x ∈ C k |∀y ∈ , x, y ∈ Z}.
A fundamental region of the lattice is a measurable set R() ⊂ R n such that R n is the disjoint union of the translates of R(), i.e. R n =˙ λ∈ (R() + λ). We denote by V () the volume of any fundamental region of , and by λ 1 () the minimum distance of the lattice, i.e. the smallest norm of a non-zero vector:
B. Flatness Factor and Discrete Gaussian Distribution
In this section, we define some fundamental lattice parameters that will be used in the rest of the paper. For more background about the smoothing parameter and the flatness factor in information theory and cryptography, we refer the reader to [6] , [48] , and [49] .
Let f √ ,c (z) denote the k-dimensional circularly symmetric complex normal distribution with mean c and covariance matrix :
We use the notation f σ,c (z) for f σ I,c (z) and f √ for f √ ,0 . Given a lattice ⊂ C k , we consider the -periodic function
Note that the restriction of f √ , (z) to any fundamental region R() is a probability distribution.
Definition 1: Given a complex lattice ⊂ C k and a positive definite matrix ∈ M n (C), the flatness factor ( √ ) is defined as the maximum deviation of f √ , from the uniform distribution over a fundamental region R() of , with volume V ():
Compared to [6] , in this paper we use an extended version of the flatness factor for correlated Gaussians, related to the extended notion of the smoothing parameter in [49] . We also extend the definition to the case of complex lattices. In the case of scalar matrices we write (σ ) = (σ I ).
Note that correlations can be absorbed by the lattice in the sense that ( √ ) = √ −1 (I ), and that ( √ 1 ) ≤ ( √ 2 ) if 1 and 2 are two positive definite matrices with 1 2 . Definition 2: Given a lattice and ε > 0, the smoothing parameter 5 η ε () is the smallest s such that λ * ∈ * \{0} e − π 2 s 2 λ * 2 ≤ ε, where * is the dual lattice. For scalar covariance matrices the smoothing parameter is related to the flatness factor as follows [6] :
More generally, for 0 we can say that
The smoothing parameter is upper bounded by the minimum distance of the dual lattice [48] . More precisely, we have the following corollary of a result by Banaszczyk [50] : 5 We define the smoothing parameter per complex dimension, which differs by a factor √ 2 from the definition in [48] . We have adjusted the bounds on η ε () accordingly.
Lemma 3: Suppose that is an n-dimensional lattice, and consider two constants c > 1
Therefore the smoothing parameter of the dual lattice is bounded as follows:
Equivalently, in terms of the flatness factor, *
Proof: Let B be the open unit ball, and ρ(A) = x∈ A e −π x 2 . From [50, Lemma 1.5] we have that
The second tool that we need to define our lattice coding schemes is the notion of discrete Gaussian distribution.
Given c ∈ C k and 0, the discrete Gaussian distribution over the (shifted) lattice − c ⊂ C k is the following discrete distribution taking values in − c:
The following result is a generalization of Regev's lemma [51, Claim 3.9 ] (see also [6, Lemma 8] ) to correlated Gaussian distributions. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 4: Let X 1 be sampled according to the discrete Gaussian distribution D +c, √ 1 and X 2 be sampled according to the continuous Gaussian f √ 2 . Let 0 = 1 + 2 and −1 = −1 1 + −1 2 . Denote by g(x) the density of the random variable X = X 1 + X 2 . If
then the L 1 distance V( , ) between the distributions g and f √ 0 is bounded as follows:
We will also need a basic result concerning linear transformations of discrete Gaussian distributions, which is proven in Appendix B.
Lemma 5: Let x be sampled according to the k-dimensional discrete Gaussian distribution D +c, √ , and let A ∈ M k (C) an invertible matrix. Then the distribution of y = Ax is
Finally, we introduce subgaussian random variables, whose tails behave similarly to the Gaussian tail distributions:
The following result holds (see also [52, Lemma 2.8] ):
The proof can be found in Appendix C.
C. Ideal Lattices From Number Fields With Constant Root Discriminant
Let us first formalize some properties of algebraic number fields that are relevant for our construction of algebraic lattice codes in the single-antenna case. We refer the reader to [53] for the relevant notions about number fields.
Let F be a totally complex number field of degree [F : Q] = 2k, with ring of integers O F . We denote by d F the discriminant of the number field. The relative canonical embedding of F into C k is given by
where {σ 1 , . . . , σ k } is a set of Q-embeddings F → C such that we have chosen one from each complex conjugate pair.
Assume that I is a fractional ideal of F, that is, there exists some integer a such that aI is a proper ideal of O F . Then = ψ(I) is a 2k-dimensional lattice in C k . In particular, ψ(O F ) is a lattice.
We define the codifferent of F as
The codifferent is a fractional ideal, and its algebraic norm is the inverse of the discriminant:
The codifferent embeds as the complex conjugate of the dual lattice:
Using Lemma 3, equation (6), we have that ∀c > 1 √ 2π
. (11) where ε k = C 2k 1−C 2k → 0 as k → ∞. 6 Due to the arithmetic mean -geometric mean inequality, for any fractional ideal
. In particular, from (9) we get
Combining equations (11) and (12), we find that the smoothing parameter of is upper bounded by the root discriminant:
Note that as long as c > 1 √ 2π
, we have C < 1 and ε k → 0 exponentially fast, but the rate of convergence will get slower if C is very close to 1.
In order to have small smoothing parameter when the dimension k is large, we need the discriminant |d F | to grow as slowly as possible with k.
Given a family F = {F k } of number fields with [F k : Q] → ∞ as k → ∞, we define the asymptotic root discriminant [54] of F as
The following theorem by Martinet [55] proves the existence of infinite towers of totally complex number fields with constant root discriminant:
Theorem 8 (Martinet) : There exists an infinite tower of totally complex number fields F C = {F k } of degree 2k = 5·2 t , such that
Consequently, rd F C ≈ 92.368. The value for rd F in Theorem 8 is not the best known possible; the existence of a family of totally complex number fields F H M with rd F H M < 82.2 was proved in [56] . However, for the number fields in this family, the root discriminant is not constant although it remains bounded.
Remark 9: Although in principle the number fields in the families F C and F H M can be computed explicitly for fixed degree k, at present an efficient algorithm to do so is not available; see the discussion in [43] .
Given a sequence F = {F k } of number fields, we denote by { (k)
D. Ideal Lattices and Normalized Product Distance
Given an element x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ C k we will use the notation p(x) = k i=1 |x i |, and define p() = inf x∈\{0} p(x).
A classically used parameter to design lattices for the Rayleigh fast fading channel [57] is the normalized product distance
The proof of the following will be given in Appendix D. Lemma 10: Let F/Q be a totally complex extension of degree 2k and let ψ be the relative canonical embedding and I a fractional ideal of F. Then
.
In other words, given a fixed number field F, the product distances of all its ideal lattices and their duals are lower bounded by the same value 2 k 2 /|d F | 1 4 , which only depends on the size of the discriminant of the field F.
This property of number fields immediately implies a result concerning the euclidean distance of lattice points in ideal lattices.
Definition 11: Given a 2k-dimensional lattice in C k , its Hermite invariant is defined as
Using the arithmetic -geometric mean inequality, we have for all 2k-dimensional lattices that
Therefore, given a fixed number field F, for any ideal I we have that
In other words, given a number field with small discriminant, then all the ideal lattices and their duals have large Hermite invariants.
III. SINGLE-ANTENNA FADING WIRETAP CHANNEL A. Channel Model
We consider the single-antenna ergodic fading channel model illustrated in Figure 1 , where the outputs y and z at Bob and Eve's end are given by
where w b,i , w e,i are i.i.d. complex Gaussian vectors with zero mean and variance σ 2 b , σ 2 e per complex dimension. A confidential message M and an auxiliary message M with rate R and R respectively are encoded into x. We denote byM the estimate of the confidential message at Bob's end.
The input x satisfies the average power constraint
We suppose that h b,i , h e,i are isotropically invariant channels such that the channel capacities C b and C e are well-defined. All rates are expressed in nats per complex channel use.
We assume that the weak law of large numbers (LLN) holds for Bob's channel:
This general setting includes the Gaussian channel, i.i.d. block fading channels where the size of the blocks is fixed and the number of blocks tends to infinity as well as all ergodic fading channels. Moreover, we require a stricter condition for Eve's channel, i.e. the asymptotic rate of convergence in the LLN should be faster than o 1 k : ∀δ > 0,
This condition is satisfied for static channels, i.i.d. fading channels and i.i.d. block fading channels, and ergodic channels whose decay of large deviations is vanishing with rate o 1 k . 7 Recall that in the ergodic case,
, where h b and h e are random variables with the same first order distribution as the processes
We suppose that Bob has perfect CSI of his own channel, and Eve has perfect CSI of both channels. Alice has no instantaneous CSI, apart from partial knowledge of channel statistics. More precisely, the knowledge of C b and C e and of the properties (21) and (22) is sufficient for Alice. Remark 14: Even if Eve knows Bob's channel H b , and even though H e and H b are possibly correlated, the leakage can still be expressed as I(M; z, H e ). In fact, the Markov chain z − H e − H b always holds, and using the chain rule for mutual information twice we get
Remark 15: To the best of our knowledge, in the case of statistical CSIT only, for general channels the strong and weak secrecy capacities C s and C w s are not known. In [11] the equality C w s = C b − C e was shown in the case of i.i.d. Rayleigh fading channels where Bob and Eve's channels are independent. 8 In [59, Lemma 2], it was shown that C w s ≥ C b −C e for arbitrary wiretap channels. In [37] (Corollary 2 and remarks about Theorem 3) it was noted that this result extends to the strong secrecy metrics for i.i.d. channels provided that exponential convergence holds in the Chernoff bound; [10] deals with general ergodic channels but considers an intermediate secrecy metrics (stronger than weak secrecy but weaker than strong secrecy).
B. Lattice Wiretap Coding
b be a pair of nested lattices in C k with nesting ratio | b / e | = e k R , and volumes
where R > 0. To simplify the notation, we will omit the dependence on k of the lattices unless necessary. Let R( e ) be a fundamental region of e . We consider the secrecy scheme in [6] , where each confidential message
To transmit the message m, Alice samples x ∈ b from the discrete Gaussian D e +λ m ,σ s with σ 2 s = P. We denote this lattice coding scheme by C( b , e ).
Remark 16 (Power Constraint and Rate of Auxiliary Message):
Thus as k → ∞, the variance per complex dimension of x tends to P provided that 8 Note that the weak secrecy capacity is an upper bound for the strong secrecy capacity. and the power constraint (20) is verified asymptotically. 9 From [6, Lemma 7 and Remark 7], the information rate H(M ) of the auxiliary message M (corresponding to the choice of a point in e ) is bounded by
If k → 0, the entropy rate of the auxiliary message tends to R as k → ∞.
Coding Scheme Based on Number Fields With Constant
F such that (23) holds. Since the choice of R and R determines the scaling factors α b and α e , we will denote the corresponding lattice coding scheme by C( F , R, R ).
C. Achievable Secrecy Rates
We now state our main result, which will be proven in sections III-D and III-E:
Theorem 17: Consider the wiretap scheme C( b , e ) in Section III-B, and suppose that there exist positive constants t b , t e such that lim inf k→∞
where Np is the normalized product distance defined in (16) . If the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel verify the conditions (21) and (22), then the codes C( b , e ) achieve strong secrecy for any message distribution p M , and thus they achieve semantic security, if
Thus, any strong secrecy rate
is achievable with the proposed lattice codes. Then, we can state the following Corollary. Corollary 18: Let F = {F k } be a sequence of number fields with rd F < ∞, where rd F is the asymptotic root discriminant defined in (14) . If the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel verify the conditions (21) and (22) respectively, then the wiretap coding scheme C( F , R, R ) achieves strong secrecy and semantic security if
is achievable with the proposed lattice codes. Proof of the Corollary: By using the definition of normalized product distance and Lemma 10 we find that for the number field lattices
) denote the set of all ergodic stationary isotropically invariant fading processes {(H b , H e )} such that (21) and (22) hold. The proposed codes are almost universal in the sense that a fixed coding scheme C( (k) , R, R ) with rates satisfying (26) achieves strong secrecy and semantic security over all channels in the set S(C b , C e ). Moreover, it is clear from the statement of Corollary 18 that this fixed code will also achieve secrecy over all fading processes in S(C b , C e ) for all C b ≥ C b and for all C e ≤ C e . Although a rate of convergence of the order o 1 k in the law of large numbers for Eve's channel seems to be necessary for strong secrecy, any rate of convergence is enough to guarantee weak secrecy:
Proposition 20: Suppose that (25) holds for the wiretap scheme C( b , e ). If the condition (21) holds for the main channel and ∀δ > 0 we have
for the eavesdropper's channel, then C( b , e ) achieves weak secrecy for all rates (26) .
A sketch of the proof of Proposition 20 can be found in Appendix F.
Remark 21: At least in the settings in which the secrecy capacity is known and is equal to C s = C b − C e , when using the Martinet family of number fields F C the proposed lattice schemes incur a gap to secrecy capacity of 2 ln(G/π) nats per channel use with G = rd F C ≈ 92.368, i.e. approximately 6.76 nats (or 9.76 bits) per channel use. When the main channel and eavesdropper's channel are i.i.d. Rayleigh channels, this corresponds to an SNR gap of approximately 30 dB (see Figure 2 ). We want to show that the average leakage with respect to the fading is small. In order to do so, we will show that for any confidential message m, the output distributions p z|H e ,M=m are close to a Gaussian distribution with high probability.
D. Proof of Theorem 17: Secrecy
1) Fixed Channel Sequence: First, we prove a bound for the leakage for a fixed channel sequence H e = diag(h e,1 , . . . , h e,k ). , if R ≥C e + ln(2c 2 e) − ln t e , for sufficiently large k ≥k(c), the leakage is bounded by 
where we define
Recalling the upper bound (6) in Lemma 3, we have that for
Using (10) and the arithmetic mean -geometric mean inequality,
Replacing in (31) , we find that
Equivalently, in terms of flatness factor we have
Then (30) 
Recalling the definition of normalized product distance and the scaling condition (23), we have 
Given δ > 0, the law of large numbers (22) implies that
Therefore the first term vanishes when k → ∞. If the bound (25) holds, then ∀γ > 0, for sufficiently large k, Np( * e ) 2/ k > t e − γ . Using Proposition 22, ∀γ > 0, the second term in (35) tends to zero and the scheme achieves strong secrecy provided that
Since this is true for any δ, γ > 0 and any c > 1 √ 2π
, we find that a rate
is required for strong secrecy. Remark 23: In equation (37), we improve the gap compared to the conference version of this paper, due to considering general c > 1 √ 2π rather than c = 1. Remark 24: In this proof we are only using the fact that the probability to have a good channel for Eve is vanishing faster than 1 k . Consequently, in the case when Alice does not know Eve's channel capacity C e but only knows an upper bound C e ≥ C e such that
holds, strong secrecy is still guaranteed provided that R > C e + ln e π − ln t e .
3) Power Constraint and Rate of Auxiliary Message:
We still need to check that the condition (24) holds. This is required for the power constraint (20) , and implies that the information rate of the auxiliary message tends to R asymptotically (see Remark 16) .
Proposition 25 (Bound for the Flatness Factor):
Proof: By the arithmetic-geometric mean inequality,
Then for ε k = C 2k 1−C 2k , we have
Therefore ε e ( √ θ t P) = ε k → 0 provided that
and t → 0, θ t → 1, we find the condition
which is weaker than (37) .
E. Proof of Theorem 17: Reliability
Recall that to transmit the message m, Alice samples x from the discrete Gaussian D e +λ m ,σ s .
Let y = H b x + w b be the received signal at Bob. Note that if Bob correctly decodes x, he can also identify the right coset of e in b , and consequently the confidential message m. 1) Fixed Channel Sequence: First of all, we prove an upper bound for Bob's finite-length error probability for a given sequence of channels
Proposition 26 (Bound for the Error Probability):
k ≥ t e for the 2k-dimensional lattices b and e , and that
− ln t e , the ML error probability for Bob is bounded by
We suppose that Bob performs MMSE-GDFE preprocessing as in [60] :
, and consider the QR decomposition
where C is a constant which does not depend on x.
Since the distribution of x is not uniform, MAP decoding is not equivalent to ML. However, similarly to [6, Th. 5], for fixed H b which is known at the receiver, the result of MAP decoding can be written aŝ
Thus, Bob can compute
where [60] . Clearly, the error probability for the original system model with optimal (MAP) decoding is upper bounded by the ML error probability for the system model (40) .
The noise v is the sum of a discrete Gaussian and of a continuous Gaussian. We will show that its tails behave similarly to a Gaussian random variable.
Suppose that a fixed message m has been transmitted, so that x ∼ D e +λ m , √ P . It follows from Lemma 7 that x is δ-subgaussian with parameter √ P for δ = ln 1+ε 1−ε provided that
which is guaranteed by (39) . This is weaker than the condition (37) we have already imposed for secrecy, so it doesn't affect the achievable secrecy rate. Consequently, for the equivalent noise v,
Therefore, v is δ-subgaussian with parameter σ b . For fixed R, from the union bound for the error probability we get
is a real scalar random variable with zero mean. By subgaussianity of v, ∀t > 0
Using the Chernoff bound, we find that ∀t > 0
The tightest bound is obtained for t = R(x − x ) /σ 2 b and yields
. Therefore we find
Due to Lemma 3, equation (5), P e (R) → 0 as long as
The minimum distance in the received lattice is lower bounded as follows using the arithmetic -geometric mean inequality:
From the scaling condition (23), we have (42), we find that P e (R) → 0 when k → ∞ as long as
Using the assumption (25), a sufficient condition is that
Recalling the hypothesis 1
this concludes the proof.
2) Random Channel Sequence: We now consider the average error probability for a random sequence of channels
. By the law of total probability, ∀η > 0,
The first term vanishes when k → ∞ due to the law of large numbers (21) . If the bound (25) 
Since η, γ > 0 and c > 1 √ 2π are arbitrary, any rate
is achievable for Bob, with R > ln(2ec 2 ) − ln t e . From equations (37) and (43), the proposed coding scheme achieves strong secrecy for any message distribution (and thus semantic security) for any secrecy rate
This concludes the proof of Theorem 17. Remark 27: In the conference version of this paper [1] , the error probability estimate was based on the sphere bound, while in this paper it is based on the union bound. Both approaches give the same gap to Bob's capacity.
Remark 28: Note that in this proof we only need the onesided law of large numbers
Therefore if Alice does not know Bob's capacity C e but only knows an upper boundC b ≤ C b , reliability holds provided that R + R <C b − ln 4 πe + ln t b . Remark 29: From Remarks 24 and 28, we can conclude that if Alice does not know the exact capacities C b and C e but is provided with a lower boundC b ≤ C b and an upper boundC e ≥ C e such that (38) holds, the scheme can still achieve strong secrecy rates R <C b −C e − 2 ln 2 π + ln t b t e .
F. Gaussian Wiretap Channel
Although in our proofs we used the product distance properties of the lattices b and * e , if we assume that the channels under consideration are Gaussian, we only need to know that the Hermite invariants of b and * e are large.
Consider the special case of the channel model (19) where h b,i , h e,i are constant and equal to 1 for all i = 1, . . . , k:
Proposition 30: Consider the wiretap scheme C( b , e ) in Section III-B, and suppose that the Hermite invariants of b and * e (see Definition 11) are bounded by
for some positive constants h b , h e . Then the codes C( b , e ) achieve strong secrecy and semantic security if
is achievable with the proposed lattice codes. The proof of Proposition 30 is very similar to the proof of Theorem 17. A sketch is provided in Appendix G.
From the bound (18), we have h b = h e = 2/ rd F for the lattices
F and Proposition 30 gives achievable rates R < ln 1 + P/σ 2 b − ln 1 + P/σ 2 e − 2 ln(rd F /π) for the wiretap coding scheme C ( F , R, R ) . This is the same result that we obtain if we apply directly Corollary 18. For the Martinet sequence F C of number fields, recalling that |d F | 1/2k = rd F C = G ≈ 92.368, we get a rather large gap to capacity of 9.75 bits per complex channel use, or 4.875 bits per real channel use, corresponding to around 30 dB (see Figure 3 ). Thus, a legitimate receiver with an SNR of 35 dB could only be protected against eavesdroppers with an SNR of 5 dB or less.
However, for general lattices the condition (45) is easier to satisfy than the condition (25) in Theorem 17. Using an analogue of the Minkowski-Hlawka theorem for inner product spaces, Conway and Thompson showed the existence of selfdual lattices with large Hermite invariants [61, Th. 9.5]:
Theorem 31 (Conway-Thompson): For all n, there exists a rank n self-dual lattice n with Hermite invariant h( n ) ≥ K (n), where K (n) ∼ n 2πe as n → ∞. Observe that identifying 2k-dimensional real lattices with k-dimensional complex lattices as in (2) 
i.e. a gap of 1.24 nats or 1.79 bits per complex channel use from the secrecy capacity, or a loss of approximately 6 dB (see Figure 3 ). This is slightly worse than the gap of 1/2 nat per real channel use (or 1 nat per complex channel use) obtained in [6] for random lattices using the Minkowski-Hlawka theorem.
On the other hand, the design criterion (45) based on the Hermite invariant, though suboptimal, is more practical to analyze the performance of non-random lattices.
IV. ALGEBRAIC LATTICE CONSTRUCTIONS FOR MULTI-ANTENNA CHANNELS
In this section, we will recall the algebraic constructions of lattice codes for multiple antenna wireless channels, which will be needed for the wiretap coding scheme in the MIMO case.
A. Matrix Lattices
The space M nk×n (C) is a 2n 2 k-dimensional real vector space endowed with a real inner product where Tr is the matrix trace. This inner product defines a metric on the space M nk×n (C) by setting ||X|| = √ X, X.
Remark 32: Consider the function ξ : M nk×n (C) → C n 2 k which vectorizes each matrix by stacking its columns. Note that ξ is an isometry between M nk×n (C) with the previously defined inner product and C n 2 k with the inner product (1) .
Given H ∈ M nk×nk (C) and X ∈ M nk×n (C), we have
Given a matrix X ∈ M nk×n (C) of the form
we introduce the notation
We also define the product determinant as follows:
Remark 33: For X of the form (48), we have
Here (a) follows from the inequality A n ≥ |det(A)| n n/2 for any A ∈ M n (C), and (b) follows from the arithmeticgeometric mean inequality. Definition 34: A matrix lattice L ⊆ M nk×n (C) has the form
where the matrices B 1 , . . . , B r are linearly independent over R, i.e., form a lattice basis, and r is called the rank or the dimension of the lattice.
The Gram matrix of an r -dimensional lattice L ⊂ M nk×n (C) is defined as
where {X i } 1≤i≤r is a basis of L. The volume of the fundamental parallelotope of L is then given by V (L) = | det(Gr(L))|.
Definition 35: Given a lattice L in M nk×n (C), the dual lattice is defined as
We also define the product determinant and normalized minimum determinant of the matrix lattice L ⊂ M kn×n (C) as follows:
B. MIMO Lattices From Division Algebras
We will first recall the construction of single-block space-time codes from cyclic division algebras (see for example [62] ). Due to space constraints, we refer the reader to [63] for algebraic definitions.
Definition 36: Let F be an algebraic number field of degree 2k and assume that E/F is a cyclic Galois extension of degree n with Galois group Gal(E/F) = σ . We can define an associative F-algebra
where u ∈ A is an auxiliary generating element subject to the relations xu = uσ (x) for all x ∈ E and u n = γ ∈ F \ {0}.
We call the resulting algebra a cyclic algebra. Here F is the center of the algebra A.
Definition 37: We call √ [A : F] the degree of the algebra A. It is easily verified that the degree of A is equal to n.
We consider A as a right vector space over E. Every element a = x 0 + ux 1 + · · · + u n−1 x n−1 ∈ A, with x i ∈ E for all i = 0, . . . , n − 1, has the following representation as a matrix:
The mapping φ is called the left regular representation of A and allows us to embed any cyclic algebra into M n (C). Under such an embedding φ(A) forms an 2kn 2 -dimensional Q-vector space.
We are particularly interested in algebras A for which φ(a) is invertible for all non-zero a ∈ A.
Definition 38: A cyclic F-algebra D is a division algebra if every non-zero element of D is invertible.
In order to code over several fading blocks, we will next define a multi-block lattice construction based on a cyclic division algebra. A multi-block embedding was constructed in [64] and [65] for division algebras whose center F contains an imaginary quadratic field. In this paper we consider a more general multi-block embedding proposed in [66] , which applies to any totally complex center F.
Let F be totally complex of degree [F : Q] = 2k. F admits 2k Q-embeddings α i : F → C in complex conjugate pairs:
Each α i can be extended to an embedding E → C. Given a ∈ D, consider the mapping ψ : D → M nk×n (C) given by φ(a) ) . . .
where each α i is extended to an embedding α i : M n (E) → M n (C).
where (a) follows from the fact that the α i are ring homomorphisms, and (b) follows from the definition of the reduced norm.
In order to obtain a matrix lattice, we will consider a suitable discrete subset of the algebra called an order.
Definition 40: A Z-order in D is a subring of D having the same identity element as D, and such that is a finitely generated module over Z which generates D as a linear space over Q.
The following result was proven in [66, Proposition 5]: Proposition 41: Let be a Z-order in D and ψ the previously defined embedding. Then ψ() is a 2kn 2 -dimensional lattice in M nk×n (C) which satisfies min a∈\{0} |pdet(ψ(a))| = 1, V (ψ()) = 2 −kn 2 |d(/Z)|.
Here d(/Z) is a non-zero integer called the Z-discriminant of the order . We refer the reader to [63] for the relevant definitions.
C. Dual Lattice and Codifferent
Let be a Z-order in D. We define the codifferent of as
where tr D/Q is the reduced trace.
The codifferent is an ideal of D, and its reduced norm is related to the discriminant as follows [63] :
Similarly to the commutative case, the codifferent of embeds as the complex conjugate of the dual lattice.
This Lemma is proven in Appendix E.
D. Orders With Small Discriminants and Dense Matrix Lattices
A family of division algebras with orders having particularly small discriminants was constructed in [43] . These orders yield dense lattices as shown in Proposition 41.
First, we need the following Theorem [67, Th. 6.14]: Theorem 43: Let F be a number field of degree 2k and P 1 and P 2 be two prime ideals of F. Then there exists a degree n division algebra D having an order with discriminant
Thanks to this property, a suitable family of division algebras can be chosen in two steps.
First, we should choose an infinite sequence of centers {F k } with small discriminants, such as Martinet's sequence F C (Theorem 8 ). Furthermore, one can choose suitable ideals in these number fields [43, Lemma 7.9] :
Lemma 44: Every number field F k in the Martinet family has ideals P 1 and P 2 such that N F/Q (P 1 ) ≤ 23 k/10 and N F/Q (P 2 ) ≤ 23 k/10 .
This leads us to the main result in [43]:
Theorem 45: Given n, there exists a sequence of totally complex number fields {F k } of degree 2k and a sequence of division algebras D k of index n over F k having an order k with discriminant
where G = rd F C ≈ 92.368 and β = 23 
E. Flatness Factor of Multi-Block Matrix Lattices From Division Algebras
Remark 46: Due to the isometry ξ between M nk×n (C) and C n 2 k (Remark 32), the definitions of flatness factor, smoothing parameter and discrete Gaussian distribution extend in a natural way for matrix lattices in M nk×n (C).
Given a lattice ⊂ M nk×n (C), a multi-block matrixX ∈ M nk×n (C) and a positive definite matrix ∈ M nk×nk (C), we define
Note that these definitions are consistent with the previous ones: for example,
We now focus on the sequence of n 2 k-dimensional multi-block matrix lattices (n,k) 
, C = c √ 2πee −πc 2 , ε = C 2n 2 k 1−C 2n 2 k . From (6) and Lemma 42, we obtain η ε ( (n,k) 
V. MIMO WIRETAP CHANNEL
A. Channel Model
We consider a MIMO fading channel model where Alice is equipped with n antennas, while Bob and Eve have n b and n e antennas respectively. In this paper, we always assume that n b ≥ n and n e ≥ n.
Transmission takes place over k quasi-static fading blocks of delay T = n, and the transmitted codeword is of the form (48) , where the matrix X i ∈ M n (C) is sent during the i -th block.
The outputs Y and Z at Bob and Eve's end respectively are given by
where the channel matrices 
The average power per symbol is σ 2 s = P n . We denote by
and ρ e = σ 2 s σ 2 e the signal-to-noise ratios for Bob and Eve respectively.
We suppose that {H b,i }, {H e,i } are isotropically invariant channels such that the channel capacities C b and C e are welldefined and ∀γ , γ > 0,
ln det I n e +ρ e H † e,i H e,i −C e > γ = 0 (59)
We suppose that Alice has no instantaneous CSI, Bob has perfect CSI of his own channel, and Eve has perfect CSI of her channel and of Bob's.
Similarly to the single-antenna case, condition (58) is satisfied for static channels, i.i.d. fading channels and i.i.d. block fading channels, and all ergodic channels; condition (59) is more restrictive and holds for static, i.i.d. fading and block fading models, and ergodic channels for which the convergence in the law of large numbers is faster than 1 k . Recall that in the ergodic case with no instantaneous CSIT, where the transmitter uses uniform power allocation, the white-input capacities of Bob and Eve's channels are given by
, C e = EH e ln det I n e + ρ e nH eH † e , whereH b ∈ M n b ×n (C) andH e ∈ M n e ×n (C) are random matrices with the same first order distribution as the processes {H b,i },{H e,i }. A confidential message M and an auxiliary message M with rate R and R respectively are encoded into the multiblock codeword X.
As in the single-antenna case (Remark 14), we have that I(M; Z |H b , H e ) = I(M; Z |H e ), i.e. the leakage is given by
Remark 47: For general channels the strong secrecy capacity is not known in this setting (see Remark 15 for the SISO case). In [19] it was shown that the weak secrecy capacity
for i.i.d. fading wiretap channels such that Bob and Eve's fadings are independent.
B. Multi-Block Lattice Wiretap Coding
Let e ⊂ b be a pair of nested multiblock matrix lattices in M nk×n (C) such that e ⊂ b and | b / e | = e nk R , with volumes scaling as follows:
where R > 0. Each message m ∈ M = {1, . . . , e nk R } is mapped to a coset leader
is a fundamental region of e . In order to transmit the message m, Alice samples X from the discrete Gaussian D e +X (m) ,σ s where σ 2 s = P n . We denote this coding scheme by C( b , e ). Similarly to Remark 16, it follows from [6, Lemma 6 and
As k → ∞, the variance per complex dimension of X tends to σ 2 s provided that
and the power constraint (57) is verified asymptotically. From [6, Lemma 7 and Remark 7], the information rate per complex symbol of the auxiliary message is bounded by
where ν t ( k ) → 0 as k → 0. If k → 0, the entropy rate of the auxiliary message tends to R .
Coding Scheme Based on Division Algebras With Constant Root Discriminant: Let { (n,k) } = {ψ( k )} be the sequence of n 2 k-dimensional multi-block matrix lattices in M nk×n (C) from Theorem 45. We consider scaled versions b = α b (n,k) , e = α e (n,k) such that e ⊂ b and | b / e | = e nk R . Given rates R, R , we denote the corresponding multi-block lattice coding scheme by C ( (n,k) , R, R ).
C. Achievable Secrecy Rates
We now state the main result for MIMO wiretap channels, which will be proven in Sections V-D and V-E.
Theorem 48: Consider the multi-block wiretap coding scheme C( b , e ) in Section V-B, and suppose that
for some positive constants d e , d b .
If the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel verify the conditions (58) and (59) respectively, then C( b , e ) achieves strong secrecy for any message distribution p M (and thus semantic security) if
is achievable with the proposed lattice codes. ,
where G = rd F C ≈ 92.368. Thus, any strong secrecy rate 
On the other hand, for the dual lattice we have pdet(( (n,k) ) * ) (a) 
where (a) follows from (52), (b) follows from (53) = pdet (( (n,k) ) * )V ( (n,k) )
, and so we find that π is achievable with the lattice codes C( (n,k) , R, R ).
The proof of Proposition 51 is very similar to the proof of Theorem 48 and is omitted.
D. Proof of Theorem 48: Secrecy
The proof follows the same steps as in the single antenna case (Section III-D).
1) Fixed Channel: First, we prove an upper bound for the finite-length leakage when the eavesdropper's channel H e is fixed. 
where ε k = C 2n 2 k 1−C 2n 2 k , and C = c √ 2πee −πc 2 . Proof: We distinguish two cases: the symmetric case (n e = n) and the asymmetric case (n e > n). a) Case n e = n: The received signal at Eve's end is Z = H e X + W e . As in equation (29) , the leakage can be written as
For a fixed realization H e = diag (H e,1 , . . . , H e, 
provided that Using (6), for ε k = C 2n 2 k 1−C 2n 2 k , the smoothing parameter of the faded lattice is upper bounded by
Using Remark 33, we find The average leakage is bounded as follows:
The first term vanishes when k → ∞ due to the condition (59) .
If the bound (62) holds, then ∀γ > 0, for sufficiently large k, δ( * e ) 2 k > d e − γ . Using Proposition 52, the second term in (71) tends to zero when k → ∞ and the scheme achieves strong secrecy provided that
is sufficient for strong secrecy.
3) Power Constraint and Entropy of Auxiliary Message:
We still need to check that the flatness factor condition (61) holds, so that the power constraint is verified asymptotically and R is the rate of the auxiliary message.
Proposition 53 (Bound for the Flatness Factor): Suppose that the δ( * e ) 2 k ≥ d e for the 2n 2 k dimensional lattice e . Let 0 < t < π and θ t = π−t π . If R ≥ n ln(2nec 2 ) − ln d e − n ln θ t , then e (
√ πeσ s .
√ 2π or equivalently R ≥ n ln(2nec 2 ) − ln d e − n ln θ t , as desired.
In particular when c → 1 √ 2π
and t → 0, θ t → 1, we obtain the condition
which is weaker than (72).
E. Proof of Theorem 48: Reliability
Recall that the received signal at Bob is 
, and consider the "thin" QR decomposition
Note that Q has orthonormal columns, R b ∈ M kn (C) is upper triangular and square block-diagonal, and
For the sake of simplicity, we consider the vectorized version of the received message: let
Then
Similarly to the single antenna case (Section III-E), Bob can compute
provided that e (σ s ) ≤ ε k < 1, which is guaranteed by Proposition 53. With the same argument as in Section III-E, we can show that the equivalent noise v is δ k -subgaussian with parameter σ b .
Following the same steps as in Section III-E, we have the union bound on the error probability for fixed R:
The minimum distance in the received lattice is lower bounded as follows:
where (a) follows from Remark 33. From the scaling condition (60), we get
Replacing in the condition (74), we have that
In particular, recalling the assumption δ( b )
or equivalently R + R <C b − n ln 8c 2 n e + ln d b . 2) Random Channel: Using the previous proposition, we now consider the behavior of the error probability for random channels H b when k → ∞. By the law of total probability, ∀η > 0,
Due to the law of large numbers (58), the first term vanishes when k → ∞. If (62) holds, then ∀γ > 0, for sufficiently large k, we have
Then using Proposition 54, the error probability in the second term tends to 0 if
where R > n ln(2nec 2 ) − ln(d e − γ ).
Since η, γ > 0 and c > 1 √ 2π are arbitrary, from equations (72) and (75), the proposed coding scheme achieves strong secrecy and semantic security rates
This concludes the proof of Theorem 48.
VI. COMPOUND MIMO CHANNEL
In this section, instead of assuming that fading is distributed according to a certain probability density function, we consider a setting where the main channel and eavesdropper's channel are unknown at the transmitter and are only known to belong to a certain uncertainty set S.
As in Section V-A, we consider a MIMO wiretap channel where Alice has n antennas, and Bob and Eve have n b and n e antennas respectively. The received signals at Bob and Eve's end are given by H e,1 , . . . , H e,k ) ∈ M n e k×nk (C), W b and W e have i.i.d. Gaussian entries with zero mean and variance σ 2 b , σ 2 e , and X satisfies the average power constraint (57) . As before, the average power per symbol is σ 2 s = P n , and ρ b = are the signal-to-noise ratios for Bob and Eve. We suppose that Bob has perfect CSI of his own channel, Eve has perfect CSI of both channels, and Alice only knows that (H b , H e ) ∈ S, where S is the uncertainty set.
We say that a coding scheme achieves strong secrecy if ∀(H b , H e ) ∈ S,
3) Compound Channel Model: In this model the channels are assumed to be held constant during transmission, i.e.
Note that in this model, Eve's channel is not necessarily degraded with respect to Bob's channel.
Remark 55: The compound secrecy capacity for an uncertainty setS ⊆S b ×S e is not known in general, but has been computed in some special cases in [68] . In particular ifS is compact, it follows from [68, Corollary 2] that the (strong) compound secrecy capacity is lower bounded as C c ≥ C b −C e . 4) Arbitrarily Varying Channel Model: In this model, the realizations {H b,i } and {H e,i } may change at each channel use in an arbitrary and unknown way [69] , and ( , ∀γ > 0, this concludes the proof.
VII. CODE DESIGN CRITERIA FOR FADING AND MIMO WIRETAP CHANNELS We will now discuss the implications of our results in terms of design of wiretap lattice codes.
A. Single Antenna Fading and Gaussian Wiretap Channels
Although in Corollary 18 we focused on a particular sequence of nested lattices e ⊂ b that were scaled versions of the same lattice (k) , Theorem 17 suggests a more general design criterion for building promising lattice codes for fading channels. Namely, we should consider pairs of nested lattices e ⊂ b for which the product Np( b ) Np( * e ) is maximized. As shown earlier, ideals from number fields with small discriminants give us promising candidates.
Here the term t b = Np( b ) 2 k can be seen as providing reliability for the communication between Alice and Bob while t e = Np( * e ) 2 k provides security against the wiretapper. While we mainly targeted general fading channels in this work, we also gained some intuition on code design in Gaussian wiretap channels. Proposition 30 suggests that in the Gaussian case one should maximize the product of the Hermite invariants
Rather than using number field lattices, in this particular case one might optimize (76) for example by considering the densest self dual lattices.
B. Code Design for MIMO Wiretap Channels
An analogous code design criterion can be given also in the MIMO case using the concept of normalized minimum determinant δ() of a matrix lattice, which was defined in Section IV-A.
Using this concept, Theorem 48 suggests that for MIMO channels we should maximize δ( * e )δ( b ).
C. Comparison With Earlier Code Design
The earliest work on lattice code design for the AWGN channel is based on an error probability approach [32] . The main criterion for maximizing the confusion of the eavesdropper is that the theta function of e should be minimized.
As this function is hard to analyze, the authors discussed a simplified criterion where one should maximize the Hermite invariant of e [32, eq. (48) ].
In comparison, our criterion differs in two ways. First, we prove that following our design principles the information leakage will be minimized. Second, our study emphasizes that the code design criterion for secrecy should be stated in terms of * e and not of e . The work [6] concentrates on achieving strong secrecy over the Gaussian wiretap channel. Its results suggest that the theta function of * e should be minimized for secrecy. Maximizing the Hermite invariant of * e can be seen as a first-order approximation of this criterion, which we now make rigorous in Proposition 30. When considering random lattices, this first order approximation yields slightly worse achievable strong secrecy rates (1.24 nats per complex channel use from secrecy capacity, versus 1 nat per complex channel use in [6] , see Section III-F).
Lattice code design for the fading wiretap channel was pioneered in [33] and [34] where the error probability approach led the authors to consider certain inverse determinant sums over the lattice e ; both of these works suggest the use of number fields for wiretap coding. Similar conditions were derived also in [38] and [70] to minimize the information leakage.
Compared to earlier works on fading wiretap channels, our criterion is the first which guarantees positive strong secrecy rates, in the sense that we prove that by maximizing Np( * e ) or δ( * e ) one can indeed push the leaked information to zero. Also similarly to the Gaussian case it seems to be better to state the design criterion for * e instead of e . Remark 57: We point out that in the derivation of the code design criterion for e in [32, p. 5706] the authors first obtain a condition for the theta function of * e and only after using Poisson summation they end up with a condition for e . So the authors could also have stated their criterion for * e . Obviously for lattices that are isodual or even self-dual it is irrelevant whether the condition is given for e or for * e . It is interesting to note that the authors in [32] were concentrating on the analysis of iso-dual or self dual lattices with large Hermite invariants. For such lattices our criterion agrees with theirs. In the fading case, [33] and [34] focused on number field and division algebra lattices. Therefore their code design principles automatically lead to lattices for which δ( * e ) is non zero.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
In this work, we have shown that algebraic lattice constructions based on number fields and division algebras can achieve strong secrecy and semantic security universally over a wide range of fading and MIMO wiretap channels. Universality is a very desirable property for practical applications, since the eavesdropper's channel is not known at the transmitter.
A. Relevance and Limitations of the Channel Model
Our model assumes perfect CSI of the legitimate channel at the receiver. This assumption is not realistic for a fast fading channel, since in practice most of the available time slots would have to be used to transmit training symbols for channel estimation.
However, our channel model is not limited to fast fading, but only assumes the weak law of large numbers for the channel statistics. This includes for example a block fading model, where some fraction of each block can be used for channel estimation and the rest is left for data transmission. We have also provided some results for the arbitrarily varying fading model in Section VI, where Bob's channel oscillates most of the time above a certain threshold and Eve's channel oscillates mostly below another threshold, without necessarily converging in mean.
In such slow fading models a long code spanning many fading blocks is required to approach capacity. Our codes readily work in such a scenario due to their universality; decoding will succeed as long as the sum capacity of the fading blocks exceeds the target rate (up to a constant gap).
We also note that even in the stationary ergodic case we require fast convergence in the law of large numbers only for the eavesdropper, while the rate of convergence can be slower for the legitimate channel. Here perfect CSI at the eavesdropper is assumed as a worst-case scenario.
A more realistic wiretap channel model with imperfect CSI at the receiver under a secrecy outage metric is left for future work.
B. Technical Improvements
Several technical improvements are needed before our lattice code construction can be implemented in practice. In particular, although the proposed families of lattices are deterministic, their construction is not explicit since it requires the computation of Hilbert class fields of high degree, for which efficient algorithms are currently not available.
Moreover, our construction incurs a large gap to the secrecy capacity. This gap might be reduced by improving the nested lattice construction, for example by taking suitable ideals of the ring of integers in the number field case, 10 or ideals of orders in the division algebra case, in order to optimize the code design according to the criteria proposed in Section VII. arbitrary, and let c 3 ∈ C k such that −1 c 3 = −1 1 c 1 + −1 2 c 2 . Then ∀x ∈ C k ,
E. Proof of Lemma 42
Let x, y ∈ D. Then we have tr D/Q (x y) = tr F/Q (tr D/F (x y)) = tr F/Q (Tr(φ(x y) (Tr(φ(x y) 
Tr(α i (φ(x y) 
By definition, ψ() * = {X ∈ M nk×n (C) : ∀y ∈ , (Tr(X † ψ(y))) ∈ Z} and so 2ψ( ∨ ) h ⊆ ψ() * . We would like to show that 2ψ( ∨ ) h = ψ() * .
The trace form tr D/Q : D × D → Q is a non-degenerate bilinear form on the Q-vector space D. Then, any full Z-module in D has a dual basis in D [53] . In particular, if {w 1 , . . . , w 2n 2 k } is a basis of as Z-module, then there exists a dual basis {w 1 , . . . , w 2n 2 k } in D such that ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n 2 k}, we have tr D/Q (w i w j ) = δ i j . Therefore, Tr(2(ψ(w i ) h ) † ψ(w j )) = tr D/Q (w i w j ) = δ i j and by definition of the codifferent, this implies that ψ(w i ) h ∈ ψ( ∨ ). Since 2ψ( ∨ ) h ⊆ ψ() * and it contains a dual basis for ψ() * , we can conclude that 2ψ( ∨ ) h = ψ() * .
F. Sketch of the Proof of Proposition 20
The proof follows the same steps as the proof of Theorem 18. Note that the bound (35) The first term vanishes because of (28) and the second term vanishes using Proposition 22 as before.
The proof of reliability is unchanged.
G. Sketch of the Proof of Proposition 30
The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 17. We only outline the main steps. Note that ∀γ > 0, for sufficiently large k, we have h( b )
1) Secrecy: With the same notation as in Section III-D, we have H e = I and = Pσ 2 e P+σ 2 e . With the same scaling as in equation (23), we can replace the bound (32) with the following:
We find that e ( √ ) → 0 as long as
This condition is equivalent to R > ln e π(h e − γ )
2) Reliability: With the same notation as in Section III-E, we have R = 1+ρ b ρ b I . With the scaling (23), the error probability tends to zero if (42) holds, that is
Recalling that ρ b = P/σ 2 b , after some elementary calculations we find
Combining equations (79) and (80), and taking γ → 0, we get the desired result.
